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ABSTRACT
Most Americans carry their cell phones everywhere. Cell phone
users can purchase ringtones to replace the traditional telephone ring.
But often the ringtones are excerpts from copyrighted works,
including popular music. This technology has grown enormously in a
short time span, forcing lawmakers to consider its applicability to
copyright laws that predate ringtones’ existence by nearly fifty years.
This Note examines the mechanical license provision of the Copyright
Act of 1976, including its overlooked legislative history, to determine
whether the mechanical license applies to ringtones. It concludes that
the statute’s requirements exclude most types of ringtones from the
scope of the mechanical license provision.

INTRODUCTION
Although some consider cell phone ringtones to be intolerably
irritating and others find them to be a welcome respite from the more
banal phone ring of the past, most people would probably agree that
ringtones are ubiquitous. For those who download ringtones, the
selected sound recording may denote one’s musical tastes and may
even influence others who hear the ringtone to inquire further into a

Copyright © 2008 by Daniel M. Simon.
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2008; Vanderbilt University, B.A. 2005.
I want to give special thanks to Duke Law School Professor Troy Dow, Vice President for
Governmental Relations at The Walt Disney Company, the Duke Law librarians for their
willingness to help dig up legislative histories, and the staff of the Duke Law Journal. Special
acknowledgement goes to Lindsey Williams for not only her musical expertise but also her
unyielding encouragement.

1866

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1865

given artist or song. Music played on cell phones is a rapidly growing
market for recording artists and music publishers alike.1 This
emerging market, although providing great potential to a struggling
2
music industry, poses intricate legal questions whose answers could
either spur growth in the market or destroy it.
Each time a user downloads and plays a song through a cell
phone, the copyrights involved in that particular song must be
3
cleared. In broad terms, a cell phone ringtone, like any other musical
recording, consists of both the sound recording and the underlying
4
musical work, of which both must be licensed to avoid an
infringement action.5 Record labels, which own the copyrights in the
6
sound recordings, generally sell ringtones to phone companies.
Although the record labels own the copyrights in the sound
recordings, music publishers own the copyrights for the underlying
musical works.7 Yet to sell ringtones to the phone companies (and
ultimately to the consumer), the record labels must also receive a
license from the music publisher.
Section 115 of the Copyright Act of 1976 (Copyright Act)8
provides a mechanical license which allows compulsory licensing of
the underlying musical work at a royalty rate set by statute, thus
obviating the need for costly negotiations.9 The Copyright Act,
however, only allows the mechanical license to operate under certain
circumstances, and it is unclear whether the license applies to cell

1. Indeed, a contributing factor is the marked increase in cell phone usage since 2000. See
Dibya Sarkar, Cell Phone Spending Surpasses Land Lines, ABC NEWS, Dec. 18, 2007,
http://i.abcnews.com/Technology/wireStory?id=4017522 (describing how cell phone spending
has surpassed landline spending).
2. Paul B. Brown, Ring Tones to the Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2005, at C5.
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2000) (“Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright . . . .”).
4. For a discussion of the characteristics of these two separate copyrights and the
distinctions between them, see infra Part I.A.
5. See infra Part I.A.
6. See ASCAP Licensing, Common Licensing Terms http://www.ascap.com/licensing/
termsdefined.html (last visited Apr. 31, 2008) (highlighting the fact that recording copyrights are
owned by record labels).
7. It is important to distinguish between music publishers and record labels. Music
publishers operate for the benefit of composers and songwriters, and they work with record
labels to provide exposure and ultimately revenue to the songwriters. Id. Record labels play a
similar role, albeit working with recording artists, by purchasing songs from the music publishers
and increasing exposure to the recording artists. Id.
8. The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2000).
9. Id. § 115.

2008]

CELL PHONE RINGTONES

1867

phone ringtones. One administrative agency, the Copyright Royalty
Board,10 has already weighed in on the decisive issue, ruling that some
ringtones may qualify under the mechanical license.11 The courts have
not yet taken up the issue.
This Note addresses some of the legal questions concerning cell
phone ringtone copyrights. Part I introduces the interplay between
law and cell phone ringtones with a general discussion of the law of
copyright in music followed by a discussion of how § 115 of the
Copyright Act relates to ringtones. Part II.A gives special attention to
distinguishing between different varieties of ringtones. This discussion
provides necessary background for comprehending the Register of
Copyrights’ Mechanical and Digital Rate Adjustment Proceeding
12
(Copyright Proceeding) found in Part II.B. Taking one portion of
the Copyright Proceeding—namely, the adaptation privilege—Part
III analyzes the proper statutory interpretation of § 115’s adaptation
privilege. This Part, in analyzing the adaptation privilege, determines
that the proper statutory interpretation of § 115 pushes most
ringtones outside its ambit. This conclusion has extraordinary
implications for the ringtone industry and may translate to a startling
increase in costs to license underlying musical works from the music
publishers.
I. WHY CELL PHONE RINGTONES
IMPLICATE COPYRIGHT’S MECHANICAL LICENSE
A. General Discussion of the Law of Copyright in Music
As compared with other forms of expression, musical works
receive unusual treatment in the Copyright Act. First, musical works
and sound recordings are separate and distinct categories of
copyrightable works.13 In fact, although musical works—that is, the
underlying composition and lyrics—have received federal copyright

10. The Copyright Royalty Board, an arm of the Copyright Register, consists of three
judges who are appointed by the Librarian of Congress and whose primary responsibility is
setting rates under the statute. Copyright Royalty Board, Background, http://www.loc.gov/
crb/background (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed.
Reg. 64,303 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order).
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (defining musical works and sound recordings as distinct
categories of works of authorship).

1868

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:1865

protection since the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act),14 federal
copyright law did not protect sound recordings15 until the Sound
Recording Act of 1971.16 Prior to that, sound recordings were seen as
17
unprotectable subject matter because Congress, in the 1909 Act,
expressed the view that the composers were the creative authors,
whereas the sound recording represented merely the mechanical
18
reproduction of that creative work. This harsh regime changed in the
early 1970s, when Congress formally brought sound recordings within
the subject matter of copyright protection alongside all other forms of
19
protectable expression in § 102 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
Despite granting federal protection to sound recordings, the 1976
Act provides thinner protection to sound recordings than other
works, including the underlying musical work, in three primary ways.
20
First, a sound recording is not accorded protection under § 106(4),
21
and thus, until 1995, there was no exclusive right of a sound
recording artist to publicly perform the sound recording. As a result,
anyone who publicly performed a copyrighted work could do so
without permission from or payment to the sound recording copyright
holder, provided that the performer obtained permission from and
paid the musical work copyright holder.22 To remedy this, Congress

14. Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 4952, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (superseded by
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2554).
15. The Copyright Act of 1976 defines sound recordings as “works that result from the
fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
16. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391. The relevant sections
were then relocated and rewritten by the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 101-810 (2000)).
17. Sound recordings were still subject to state and common law copyright protection, but
this protection was uneven at best. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2.10[B] (2007).
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 9 (1909) (“It is not the intention of the committee to
extend the right of copyright to mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the
composer or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the provisions of the bill, of
the manufacture and use of such devices.”).
19. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2554 (codifying sound recordings
with the other permissible subject matters for copyrights at 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000)).
20. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2000) (granting copyright protection to “literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual
works”).
21. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
22. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.14[A]. For a general overview of the policy
reasons behind not extending any sort of performance right to sound recordings, see Robert L.
Bard & Lewis S. Kurlantzick, A Public Performance Right in Recordings: How to Alter the
Copyright System Without Improving It, 43 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152 (1974).
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enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of
1995,23 which allows the copyright holder the exclusive right to
authorize others “to perform the [sound recording] publicly by means
24
of a digital audio transmission.” Despite passage of the DPRSRA,
protection to the copyright owner remains limited because it still
allows any second comer to publicly perform the sound recording (so
25
long as it is not a digital audio transmission) without compensating
26
the recording artist.
The second primary vehicle for limiting the copyright protection
accorded to music is § 114’s limitations on the § 106(6) copyright
27
protection for sound recordings. Section 114 limits the sound
recording copyright owner’s reproduction right and distribution right
28
to the “actual sounds fixed in the recording.” In practical terms, this
means that a sound recording copyright holder cannot claim
infringement when another recording artist creates a cover of the
song, even though the artist reproduces the sounds of the original.29
Where digital reproduction of a sound recording occurs, the “actual

23. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act (DPRSRA) of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114–15 (2000)).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
25. A “digital transmission” is defined in § 101 as “a transmission in whole or in part in a
digital or other nonanalog format.” Id. § 101. The DPRSA is more complex as some digital
performances are exempt altogether, and although noninteractive services are covered by the
statutory license, interactive services are fully subject to the exclusive rights of the sound
recording copyright owner. See generally NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.21–24
(detailing the various complexities of the DPRSA). Because this is beyond the scope of this
Note, it is not necessary to further develop the details of DPRSA.
26. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the performer would
compensate the composer, lyricist, or music publisher. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
This compensation would be subject to the limitations on the public performance. 17 U.S.C.
§ 110.
27. The Copyright Act does not provide blanket and exclusive protection on use; instead,
§ 106 grants that a given copyright owner may hold only the right to reproduce (that is, the right
to make copies), the right to prepare derivative works, the right to distribute copies to the
public, the right to public performance, and the right to public display. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
28. Id. § 114(b) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
[the reproduction and adaptation rights] do not extend to the making or duplication of another
sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though
such sounds imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.”).
29. There may be an extremely rare case in which protection is accorded through publicity
or misappropriation rights when a second comer is passing off the song for commercial
advantage without attributing. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988)
(“We hold only that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known and is
deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs
and have committed a tort in California.”).
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sounds fixed in the recording” are directly copied to a new medium.30
This is a major limitation on the protection afforded sound recording
artists, but its purpose is to promote the proliferation of creative
31
works by allowing future artists to build on prior works.
Third, and perhaps most relevant for purposes of this
examination of cell phone ringtones, is the § 115’s mechanical license,
which limits a musical work’s copyright holder’s reproduction and
distribution rights by requiring the rights holder to license the musical
work in certain circumstances. Section 115 applies to copyright
holders of nondramatic musical works, including music publishers,
32
lyricists, and composers. It allows anyone wishing to reproduce the
work to obtain a statutory mechanical license, but it does not apply to
33
the sound recording copyright. Section 115 provides a statutory
mechanical license by which anyone can either reproduce or
34
distribute a phonorecord of the musical work so long as it has
previously been distributed in phonorecords in the United States with
authorization of the copyright owner and provided that
compensation, as set forth by the Copyright Royalty Board,35 is paid
to the copyright owner.36 The license is a “mechanical license”
because the parties need not negotiate over terms; instead, everyone
holds a license to either reproduce or distribute a musical work—
regardless of permission—so long as there is proper payment. The
practical effect of the mechanical license is to turn this strand of

30. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 799–800 (6th Cir. 2005) (“This
means that the world at large is free to imitate or simulate the creative work fixed in the
recording so long as an actual copy of the sound recording itself is not made.”).
31. See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 9 (1909) (“It is not the intention of the committee to
extend the right of copyright to the mechanical reproductions themselves, but only to give the
composer or copyright proprietor the control, in accordance with the provisions of the bill, of
the manufacture and use of such devices.”).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 115.
33. Palladium Music, Inc. v. EatSleepMusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193, 1200 (10th Cir. 2005).
34. Although much of the Copyright Act refers to “copies,” it defines “phonorecords” as
those “material objects in which sounds . . . are fixed by any method now known or later
developed.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
35. Id. § 801(b)(1). It should be noted that rates may also be set based on agreement of the
parties. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[I] (“A copyright owner and a licensee
phonorecord maker and/or distributor may elect to waive the compulsory license, and enter into
a consensual agreement.”). The Copyright Royalty Board was formed in 2005 and consists of
three judges whose primary role is to determine the rates and terms of the Copyright Act’s
statutory licenses. Copyright Royalty Board, supra note 10. The judges are appointed by the
Librarian of Congress. Id.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)–(c)(1).
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property rights into a liability rule,37 allowing anyone to use the
owner’s property provided that such use is in accordance with the
rules set forth in the statute.
Congress passed Section 115 following White-Smith Music
Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,38 in which a plaintiff-composer brought
39
suit to enjoin Apollo’s alleged infringement. Apollo was in the
business of manufacturing player pianos which used perforated rolls
to mechanically produce songs on the pianos.40 The Supreme Court
ruled for the defendant, holding that the perforated music roll did not
41
constitute a “copy” of the underlying musical work. In enacting the
mechanical license in the 1909 Act, Congress intended to specifically
overrule the holding in White-Smith to provide some means of
compensation to the copyright owner for mechanical reproductions of
their works.42 Congress attempted to address that concern by
balancing the public’s interest in gaining access to the creative works
with the overarching goal of compensating music composers
adequately.43 Striking this balance would fulfill the constitutional
44
prerogative “[t]o promote the Progress of Science.”

37. See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 2655, 2661 (1994) (equating compulsory licenses with liability rules).
38. White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id. at 8–9.
41. Id. at 18 (“These perforated rolls are parts of a machine which, when duly applied and
properly operated in connection with the mechanism to which they are adapted, produce
musical tones in harmonious combination. But we cannot think that they are copies within the
meaning of the copyright act.”).
42. H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 52 (1976) (“This broad language is intended to avoid the artificial
and largely unjustifiable distinctions, derived from cases such as White-Smith . . . .”); see also
Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg.
64,303, 64,304 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order) (“[The mechanical license was]
originally enacted to address the reproduction of musical compositions on perforated player
piano rolls . . . .”).
43. See Paul S. Rosenlund, Compulsory Licensing of Musical Compositions for
Phonorecords Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 683, 686 (1979) (“The feelings
in Congress at the time were that the American public should continue to have access to the
popular music of the day, but that the growing economic importance of mechanically
reproduced music made it necessary to guarantee composers adequate compensation for their
work.” (citing H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909))).
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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B. Section 115 and Cell Phone Ringtones
The interpretation of § 115 is the primary source of controversy
with respect to cell phone ringtones. This Section demonstrates that
§ 115 is the primary source of concern in this debate because that
provision determines whether recording labels, in preparing and
vending ringtones to the phone companies, can purchase the rights to
the underlying composition at the statutory rate, or whether they
must conduct arms-length negotiations for these rights.
The preamble to § 115 states that it affects only the copyright
owner’s exclusive reproduction and distribution rights under
§§ 106(1) and 106(3) of the Copyright Act.45 Thus, if ringtones are
considered derivative works46 of copyrighted works, and thus subject
to copyright protection under another provision, §106(2), they cannot
be made or distributed using a § 115 mechanical license. On the other
hand, if they do not qualify as derivative works, then § 115 may apply,
and so ringtones must meet the conditions set forth in § 115(a). Thus,
asking whether a given work could qualify as a derivative work is an
important threshold question.
Under the Copyright Act, a derivative work must “represent an
47
original work of authorship,” meaning it requires a constitutionally
48
minimum level of creativity. One district court judge elaborated on
what would qualify as a derivative work in a musical composition:
[T]here must be present more than mere cocktail pianist variations
of the piece that are standard fare in the music trade by any
competent musician. There must be such things as unusual vocal
treatment, additional lyrics of consequence, unusual altered
harmonies, novel sequential uses of themes—something of
substance added making the piece to some extent a new work with
the old song embedded in it but from which the new has developed.
It is not merely a stylized version of the original song where a major
artist may take liberties with the lyrics or the tempo, the listener

45. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000) (“In the case of nondramatic musical works, the exclusive
rights provided by clauses (1) [to reproduce] and (3) [to distribute] of section 106 . . . are subject
to compulsory licensing . . . .”).
46. A derivative work is defined in the Copyright Act as “a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” Id. § 101 (2000).
47. Id.
48. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). The Court noted
that “the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice.” Id.

2008]

CELL PHONE RINGTONES

1873

hearing basically the original tune. It is, in short, the addition of such
new material as would entitle the creator to a copyright on the new
49
material.

This passage sets forth an originality requirement for derivative
works in musical compositions. In fact, the originality requirement for
50
51
derivative works is the same as for original works. Yet because
§ 115 expressly does not affect the copyright owner’s exclusive right
52
to create derivative works, a derivative work with the requisite
originality likely would not fall within the bounds of the license. The
Register of Copyrights acknowledged that if a particular work
exhibited the constitutionally mandated “originality,” then it would
fall outside the scope of § 115.53 This proposition is correct. The plain
statutory language of § 115(a)(2) excludes those works that are
54
changed to such a degree that they constitute derivative works, and
55
this exclusion places a ceiling on the adaptation privilege that the

49. Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (footnotes omitted), rev’d
on other grounds, 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
50. A derivative work is defined in the Copyright Act as “a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization,
motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any
other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 17 U.S.C. § 101.
51. See id. § 103 (“The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102
includes . . . derivative works . . . .”); see also WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:50
(2007) (“Moreover, the standard of originality for derivative works is no different than for
nonderivative works.”).
52. Because the preamble to § 115 acknowledges only the right to copy and the right to
distribute, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, it does not affect the right to create
derivative works under § 106(2).
53. The Register of Copyrights explained:
We note that Section 115 permits the creation of derivative works, but this privilege
under the statutory license is limited to making musical arrangements necessary to
conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved. For
purposes of our discussion in this proceeding, when we refer to derivative works not
covered by Section 115, we mean those types of works that exhibit a degree of
‘originality’ as that term is defined in court precedent. The addition of original
material would not only take a ringtone outside the scope of the privilege of making
arrangements, it would also take the ringtone outside the Section 115 license
altogether.
Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg.
64,303, 64,305 n.8 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order) (citation omitted).
54. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (a)(2); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (explaining that
§ 115 covers only the right to copy and the right to distribute, not the right to create derivative
works).
55. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (a)(2); see also infra Part III.
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mechanical license grants.56 In other words, if a given arrangement has
enough added creativity that it qualifies as a derivative work, it does
not fall under the mechanical license. Yet, if the given arrangement
has less originality—thus it does not qualify as a derivative work—it
may fall under § 115, provided that it meets the other requirements of
§ 115(a)(2).
The relevant uncertainty, however, is whether these rights
include the rights necessary to create a ringtone of the same
composition. It is the recording labels, known as the “Big Four”—
Universal Music Group, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, EMI
Group, and Warner Brothers Music57—that sell ringtones to the
phone companies. Thus, the record companies must have the
necessary rights to the musical works from the music publishers to
manufacture, distribute, or otherwise license these ringtones.58 This is
the heart of the issue: must a record company secure such rights
directly from the music publisher, or can it rely on the mechanical
license and the corresponding statutory rate for copies?
Record labels normally enter into arms-length negotiations with
the music publishers to obtain the rights to the musical works to
create, distribute, promote, and sell ringtones to phone companies
like Verizon and AT&T.59 The rates that these license negotiations
establish are considerably higher than the mechanical license rates set
60
forth in § 115. Music publishers license works to record labels for as

56. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (“A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a
musical arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of
interpretation of the performance involved, but the arrangement shall not . . . be subject to
protection as a derivative work under this title . . . .”).
57. Brett J. Miller, Comment, The War Against Free Music: How the RIAA Should Stop
Worrying and Learn to Love the MP3, 82 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 303, 319 n.115 (2005).
58. In some instances, ownership of the sound recording copyright may be a contested
issue. Although the recording artist first performs the work, industry-standard contracts
regularly treat sound recordings as works made for hire. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17,
§ 30.03[A] (setting forth an industry-standard contract). Even when the recording artist is a
copyright owner, the artist may not be the only copyright owner. There may be producers,
sound mixers, background musicians, and others who may contribute original expression
sufficient to merit protection as a copyright owner. Consequently, who owns the copyright is a
complicated issue, but for purposes of this Note, it is safe to assume that the recording studio
owns the sound recording copyright, whether by operation of law or through contract.
59. See Neil J. Rosini & Michael I. Rudell, Ring Tone Revenues Foster Copyright Détente,
N.Y.L.J., Dec. 23, 2005, at 3 (analogizing the ringtone market to the CD industry, in which
record labels obtain licenses from publishers and then produce and sell the CDs themselves).
60. Carmen Kate Yuen, Scuffling for a Slice of the Ringtone Pie: Evaluating Legal and
Business Approaches to Copyright Clearance Issues, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 541, 544 (2006).
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much as twenty-five cents per song, compared with the mechanical
license’s rate of slightly over nine cents per song.61 Music publishers,
therefore, would much prefer to leave the system as is, so that they
could negotiate these licenses directly with the Big Four, thus
garnering this higher rate. In contrast, the record labels argue that
ringtones are subject to § 115 to obtain the statutory rate provided by
62
the statute. But copyright owners generally complain that statutory
rates are below market value, so record labels (probably fairly)
expect to achieve a better deal through the § 115 license than they
63
otherwise would in the marketplace. In a growing industry, the
stakes are huge; given the huge volume of ringtones purchased each
year,64 even a small change in royalties can pay huge dividends to the
winner of this battle. In short, how copyright law determines this
question can translate into tens of millions of dollars of lost yearly
income for either music publishers or record labels.
II. CELL PHONE RINGTONES
A. Distinguishing between Different Varieties of Ringtones
To appreciate the subtleties of the applicable copyright laws, it is
desirable—and perhaps necessary—to apply the law to varying types
of ringtones. Like ice cream, ringtones come in many different
flavors, each of which may have a differing treatment under
65
copyright. For instance, a derivative work may result by reducing the
melody to a simple monophonic tone—thus rendering it ineligible for
the § 115 mechanical license—whereas an entirely different treatment
may result from a ringtone that is a short snippet of the identical
sound recording. Although it is not necessary to exhaust these

61. Id. (asserting that the traditional royalty sought by music publishers is approximately
three times that set forth by the statute).
62. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed.
Reg. 64,303, 64,305 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order).
63. Yuen, supra note 60, at 544 (“Publishers are accustomed to receiving ten percent of the
retail price of ringtones, and since a master ringtone retails for $2.49 to $2.99, a publisher would
be entitled to 24.9 to 29.9 cents per sale.”).
64. BMI, BMI Forecasts U.S. Ringtone Sales to Hit $600 Million in 2006, Apr. 2, 2006,
http://www.bmi.com/news/entry/334746. BMI sold over 360 million ringtones from 2001 to 2005.
Id. Ringtone sales reached $500 million in 2005 alone. Id.
65. See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71
Fed. Reg. at 64,304 (“[T]here are a variety of different types of ringtones ranging from those
that are simple excerpts taken from a larger musical work to ones that include additional
material and may be considered original musical works in and of themselves.”).
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possibilities, this Section chooses four ringtones—each with differing
characteristics—to better understand the law’s treatment of these
types of works.
The varying types of ringtones can best be described based on
their degree of similarity to the original sound recording. That is, this
scale is based on the amount of additional creativity needed to
produce the ringtone.66 The first type of ringtone, beginning on the
spectrum from the least amount of creativity required to produce a
ringtone from the original, is a “true tone” or a “real tone.” A “true
tone” is an exact duplication of a sound recording, albeit in a
shortened form.67 For instance, Justin Timberlake’s “Rock Your
68
Body” is a four-minute and twenty-seven-second song that was
released in full form and played over the radio throughout the world.
The “Rock Your Body” ringtone is a shortened version, playing
approximately thirty seconds of the original song.69 Nothing about the
song was changed; rather, the only “creativity” in compiling the
ringtone was selecting which portion of the song to include. In this
example—as in most true tones—the ringtone captures the “hook,”
or the most popular refrain of a sound recording.70 By 2006, with the
increasing popularity of cell phones with MP3 capability, this type of
71
ringtone accounted for 60 percent of all ringtone revenues.

66. The reasons for this scale are twofold. First, it provides a helpful guide for determining
how far a ringtone strays from the original sound recording. This shift away from the original
can greatly alter the copyright treatment of the ringtone, perhaps more than for any other
variable. Second, courts have used this variable in determining the “transformative” nature of a
work as a springboard for analyzing whether that work qualifies as a derivative work. See supra
notes 47–54 and accompanying text.
67. See Steven Masur & Ursa Chitrakar, Essay, The History and Recurring Issues of
Ringtones: Lessons for the Future of Mobile Content, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 149, 152 (2006)
(“Master Ringtones (also called ‘truetones’ or ‘mastertones’) are excerpts from the actual sound
recordings of popular songs.”); Marcy Rauer Wagman & Rachel Ellen Kopp, The Digital
Revolution Is Being Downloaded: Why and How the Copyright Act Must Change to
Accommodate an Ever-Evolving Music Industry, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 271, 288 n.63
(2006) (“A ‘true tone’ or ‘trutone’ is a ringtone that is a short (approximately thirty-second)
music clip edited directly from an original sound recording and made available to consumers for
downloading onto their cell phones to represent their own, recognizable cell phone ring.”).
68. JUSTIN TIMBERLAKE, Rock Your Body, on JUSTIFIED (Jive Records 2002).
69. An example of a website from which to download the Justin Timberlake “Rock Your
Body” ringtone is Thumbplay, Rock Your Body Ringtone, http://www.thumbplay.com/join/
Justin+Timberlake-artist-Rock+Your+Body-genre-ringtones-bonus (last visited Mar 17, 2008).
70. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed.
Reg. 64,303, 64,305 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order).
71. Narasu Rebbapragada, The Playlist: Ring Tones Are Music Too, PCWORLD.COM, Mar.
22, 2006, http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,125125-page,1/article.html.
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The second type of ringtone that illustrates the differing
treatment of ringtones under the Copyright Act is similar to a true
tone, except that it adds new material not otherwise found in the
original sound recording. Perhaps the best example is Beyoncé’s “Let
Me Cater 2 You” ringtone, which consists of a smaller portion of the
actual song followed by Beyoncé’s voice proclaiming, “What’s up, this
72
is Beyoncé from Destiny’s Child and this call is for you.” The status
of these types—which can be called “true tones plus”—may vary
considerably from actual true tones because of the additional
commentary. Those ringtones that incorporate this additional
commentary in lyrical and musical form are also included in this “true
tones plus” category.
The third and fourth categories of ringtones, which depart most
from the original sound recording, are monophonic and polyphonic
ringtones, respectively. Monophonic ringtones, which polyphonic
ringtones largely have supplanted, introduced the ringtone to cell
phone users. These ringtones play single notes in succession to create
the impression that the actual sound recording is being played.73
Oftentimes, it is difficult for the listener to even identify the song,
because the simplicity of the one-note tune makes it difficult to
transcribe complex sound recording arrangements.
More easily identifiable as the original song, yet the ringtone
which departs most from the original sound recording, are polyphonic
ringtones. As cell phone speaker technology progressed, these
ringtones became the standard, until cell phones with MP3
74
technology began to play true tones. Polyphonic ringtones, as the
name implies, play multiple lines simultaneously. Because multiple
sounds emanate from a band—such as the voice, drums, and guitar
sounds—these polyphonic ringtones more closely approach the
rhythm and melody of the original sound recording.75

72. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 64,312; see also Scott Hervey, Copyright Office Clears the Way for More Ringtones,
THEIPLAWBLOG.COM, Oct. 24, 2006, http://www.theiplawblog.com/archives/copyright-lawcopyright-office-clears-the-way-for-more-ringtones.html (suggesting that the Beyoncé ringtone
could qualify as a derivative work).
73. Masur & Chitrakar, supra note 67, at 151 (“[Monophonic ringtones] means that single
note sounds were played in succession when the phone rang.”).
74. See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71
Fed. Reg. at 64,304.
75. Id. at 64,305 n.16 (“In 2001, polyphonic ringtones were developed, allowing multiple
notes to be played at the same time, creating a fuller-sounding ringtone.”).
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Monophonic and polyphonic ringtones lie on the very end of the
spectrum because they probably require a professional with a keen
76
ear to manually transcribe the original sound recording. The final
77
78
result is a ringtone which incorporates only the melody and rhythm
of a piece (and, in the case of a polyphonic ringtone, also the
harmony79). Because it is not only possible but probable that two
different transcribers can produce either a monophonic or polyphonic
ringtone that is vastly different from one another, it is likely that
there is a significant degree of creativity in these ringtones.80
B. The Register of Copyrights’s Copyright Proceeding Decision
On October 16, 2007, the Copyright Office, acting on a request
on behalf of the Recording Industry Association of America, Inc.
(RIAA) to clarify the treatment of cell phone ringtones under
existing copyright laws, handed down a final order in the Copyright
Proceeding that concluded that ringtones could be subject to the
mechanical licensing scheme.81 The National Music Publishers
Association, Inc., the Songwriters Guild of America, and the
Nashville Songwriters Association International (collectively, Music
Publishers) filed a motion in opposition of the RIAA position.
Although concluding that certain ringtones could be subject to
mechanical licensing, the Register did also note that certain types of
76. M. D. Plumbley et al., Automatic Music Transcription and Audio Source Separation, 33
CYBERNETICS & SYSTEMS 603, 608 (2002) (“Transcription of polyphonic music introduces a
number of new complexities that are not present in the monophonic version of this problem.
Because we have more than one possible note at once, we can no longer be sure that there will
be a single delay at which the whole waveform will repeat . . . .”). This indicates that, even
where transcription is done by computer, its translation to polyphonic forms involves an
increased level of difficulty.
77. Melody is defined as “a rhythmic succession of single tones organized as an aesthetic
whole.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 722 (10th ed. 2001).
78. Rhythm is “the aspect of music comprising all the elements (as accent, meter, and
tempo) that relate to forward movement.” Id. at 1002.
79. Harmony is “the combination of simultaneous musical notes in a chord.” Id. at 530.
80. There are cases that say that exact replicas in different media, even if they require great
skill, do not demonstrate sufficient originality to merit protection. E.g., Gracen v. Bradford
Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983) (denying protection to a painting of Dorothy from The
Wizard of Oz); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 911 (2d Cir. 1980) (denying
protection to three-dimensional reproductions of Disney characters); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v.
Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 488 (2d Cir. 1976) (denying protection to Uncle Sam banks); Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951) (denying protection to a
reproduced mezzotint engraving).
81. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed.
Reg. 64,303, 64,303 (Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order).
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ringtones, depending on their individual characteristics, could fall
outside the scope of the statute.82 In examination of these issues, the
Register identified a number of ambiguities with respect to the
83
relationship between ringtones and § 115. This Section summarizes
the issues raised in the Copyright Proceeding to provide some
perspective as to how copyright laws treat ringtones generally.
The first issue presented by the parties was whether ringtones
meet the definition of “digital phonorecord deliveries.” The Digital
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 199584 allows the
licensee of a § 115 mechanical license to “distribute or authorize the
distribution of a phonorecord of a nondramatic musical work by
means of a digital transmission which constitutes a digital
phonorecord delivery.”85 This amendment was a response to the
newly developed use of transmitting songs digitally.86 The Register
found that ringtones fit within the definition of digital phonorecord
87
deliveries without much dispute from either party.
Next, the Register addressed the parties’ arguments concerning
whether § 115 could license only portions of works, as compared with
88
the entire work. Because ringtones necessarily use small portions of
the longer sound recording, the RIAA argued that it could use the
mechanical license even when only portions of the musical work were
being used. The Register agreed with this point and, using traditional
methods of statutory interpretation, concluded that “an excerpt may
qualify for the statutory license if all other requirements are met.”89
The Register adopted the RIAA’s argument that “[f]or the
derivative work right to be infringed, the defendant must have
created a derivative work, and for the derivative work to have been
created, the Act requires the contribution of expressive content
90
capable of standing on its own as a copyrightable work.” Thus, a cell

82. See id. 64,305 (“[D]ifferent types of ringtones may be treated differently for [statutory]
purposes.”).
83. Id.
84. 17 U.S.C. §§ 114–15 (2000).
85. Id. § 115(c)(3)(A).
86. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.24[A].
87. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 64,307.
88. Id. at 64,313–16.
89. Id. at 64,308.
90. Id. at 64,309 (quoting RIAA Initial Brief at 11, Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord
Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,303 (No. RF 2006-1)).
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phone ringtone, which is merely a shortened version of a sound
recording, is not sufficiently original to be considered a derivative
work. Although the Register did acknowledge that certain ringtones
may be considered derivative works because they do exhibit a
minimal degree of originality,91 it also concluded many ringtones
would not fall under this category.92 In the end, the Register agreed
with the RIAA’s argument that those ringtones which are merely
93
shortened versions of the sound recording are not derivative works.
The Register refused to decide the issue of other ringtones, including
those which contain new lyrics, stating that “they involve factual
issues and potentially close questions that need not be resolved
here.”94
Following the discussion of derivative works, the Register then
investigated what is at the crux of Part III: the arrangement privilege
under § 115(a)(2).95 Suffice it to say that this portion of the opinion is
subject to considerable criticism, and Part III.B discusses it in detail
along with a fresh reading of the legislative history. Lastly, the
Register’s office considered the private use exception,96 which states
that, for § 115 to be applicable, the “primary purpose in making
phonorecords [must be] to distribute them to the public for private
use.”97 In addressing this potential complication, the Register
distinguished between the intentions of the individual cell phone
ringtone consumer and the distributor of the ringtone. So long as the
distributor’s primary purpose was to distribute the digital
phonorecord delivery for private use, the Register reasoned, then the
individual ringtone consumer’s purpose is irrelevant.98 Thus, the
Register concluded that the private use exception was a bar to the
application of § 115.

91. A true tones plus may have been what the Register had in mind, as the additional lyrics
or commentary could provide sufficient originality to constitute a derivative work.
92. Id. at 64,310.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 64,311.
95. Id. at 64,313–15.
96. Id. at 64,315.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2000).
98. See Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71
Fed. Reg. at 64,314–15 (“[R]ingtones satisfy the private use requirement because the primary
purpose of the distributor is to distribute them to individual consumers for their own personal
use and enjoyment, on those consumers’ cell phones, in whatever manner the consumer sees
fit . . . .”).
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In a monumental loss to music publishers, the Register
concluded that the RIAA could rely on § 115 to license most
99
ringtones. For cell phone ringtones to fall within the mechanical
license of § 115, the ringtones’ attributes must fall within the
requirements set forth in the statute; yet, the Register’s Copyright
Proceeding failed to fully dissect these requirements. Because the
100
Register’s Copyright Proceeding does not bar judicial review, the
Copyright Proceeding is not the definitive ruling on this issue. Indeed,
its analysis did not bring clarity to this muddled area of law.
Unfortunately, the Register bypassed the opportunity to set forth
clear guidelines for the ringtone industry, and in doing so, opened the
door to further challenges of these provisions.
III. THE ADAPTATION PRIVILEGE: HOW LIMITED?
This Part examines one of the four requirements of § 115(a)(2)—
the arrangement privilege—and dissects it in a way that the courts
may find helpful in the future. The arrangement privilege may be the
most important issue for determining the status of ringtones under the
Act for two reasons. First, neither courts nor commentators have
expounded the impact of the adaptation privilege on the scope of the
mechanical license. Indeed, the legislative history shows that
Congress had intended the adaptation to be rather limited.101 Second,
the Register’s analysis of the adaptation privilege is the most
incomplete because it does not draw the line between ringtones that
are covered by the privilege and those that are not. The Register and
most scholars have analyzed § 115(a)(2) as a whole, losing sight of the
four individual requirements explicitly set forth by Congress that a
work must meet to qualify for the adaptation safe harbor. This Part
explains each of these four requirements in detail, but it must be
remembered that ringtones are only subject to the mechanical license
if all four of the requirements are met.102

99. Id. at 64,304.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 803(d)(1).
101. See infra Part III.B (discussing the legislative history behind § 115’s adaptation
privilege).
102. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 64,303.
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The § 115 mechanical license allows limited, adaptation of the
work without separately securing the authorization of the copyright
owner. Specifically, § 115(a)(2) states:
A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical
arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the
style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but
the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental
character of the work, and shall not be subject to protection as a
derivative work under this title, except with the express consent of
104
the copyright owner.

This subsection allows the licensee at least some room to maneuver in
making the new musical arrangement. Some have argued that it was
necessary to draft some leeway into § 115 to further the goals of the
mechanical license.105 In the end, the Register agreed with the RIAA’s
argument that “shortening a musical work is necessary to conform the
song to the style or manner of the performance involved because
ringtones necessitate brevity.”106
Because there is no case law interpreting § 115(a)(2),107 it is
difficult to determine how a court dealing with the issue would
respond. It is not a fruitless adventure, however; traditional notions of
statutory interpretation provide useful guidance. The subsection
seems to create a safe harbor to the compulsory licensee who alters
the original so long as the alteration falls within the bounds of
§ 115(a)(2). To obtain a mechanical license to create and distribute a
ringtone that makes an alteration to the original musical work, the
licensee must meet four requirements under § 115(a)(2). The
subsection states, in full:

103. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[F] (“[T]he compulsory licensee’s right to
make new arrangements is limited.”).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
105. Id. (“A limited adaptation right is clearly necessary if the compulsory license provision
is to be implemented, inasmuch as different performers require some variation in musical
arrangements.”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 109 (1976) (“The second clause of subsection (a) [of
§ 115] is intended to recognize the practical need for a limited privilege to make arrangements of
music being used under a compulsory license, but without allowing the music to be perverted,
distorted, or travestied.” (emphasis added)).
106. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 64,304.
107. See id. (“[D]efining the parameters of Section 115(a)(2) is difficult because there is no
precedent . . . .”).
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A compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical
arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the
style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved, but
the arrangement shall not change the basic melody or fundamental
character of the work, and shall not be subject to protection as a
derivative work under this title, except with the express consent of
108
the copyright owner.

First, the alteration must be a change in the “arrangement” of the
109
original. Second, the arrangement only must change “to the extent
necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the
performance involved.”110 Third, the arrangement may not “change
111
the basic melody” of the original. Lastly, the arrangement may not
change “the fundamental character of the work.”112 These
requirements are explicit in the statute, and any court that fails to find
all four requirements as a precondition for § 115 is misapplying the
statute. This Part analyzes all four of these conditions precedent in
turn, providing an interpretation of § 115(a)(2) that may prove useful
in the absence of meaningful guidance from either the Copyright
Office or the courts.
In the Copyright Proceeding, the Register merged the four
requirements explicitly set forth by § 115(a)(2) in a way that loses
sight of the distinct statutory components. Regarding the general
arrangement requirement of the § 115(a)(2) safe harbor, the Register
made three general observations:
First, the user’s right to make a melodic arrangement should be
limited so that the basic character of the musical work is preserved.
Second, a mastertone that merely shortens the full length work to
conform it to the physical limitations of the cellphone does not
affect the musical work’s arrangement. Finally, a ringtone that
makes minor changes to lyrics of the underlying musical work
113
generally does not affect its arrangement.

The first observation simply restated the fourth requirement of
§ 115(a)(2) that the arrangement may not change “the fundamental
108. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2000).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 64,314 (footnotes omitted).
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character of the work.” It provided absolutely no insight into what an
“arrangement” is. The second observation—that a mastertone which
shortens the work does not affect the “arrangement”114—was similarly
incomplete. Lastly, the Register stated that “minor changes” to the
115
This
lyrics in a ringtone do not affect the “arrangement.”
observation is conclusory, and depend on what the “minor changes”
are. Ultimately, the Register largely ignored the mandates of § 115 by
failing to adequately address each of the four elements of the
adaptation privilege. Separate consideration of each element leads to
the conclusion that most ringtones are not necessarily covered by the
mechanical license.
A. “Arrangement”
The first requirement—namely, that the given work is an
“arrangement”—probably would not exclude a significant number of
ringtones from the mechanical license. Determining whether a given
alteration to a musical work changes the “arrangement” first requires
a precise definition of “arrangement.” In the Copyright Proceeding,
the meaning of the word was disputed, and each party provided
definitions to best support its platform.116 Ultimately, the Register
defined “arrangement” as “[t]he process or result of readjusting a
117
from that
work for performance by different artistic means
originally intended.”118
In short, the breadth of this definition—as interpreted through
the Register’s definition—means that an “arrangement” may include
114. See infra Part III.A.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 64,313 (“[T]he parties have used various dictionaries and web sites to support
their definitional argument, but there is no consensus on what sources are valid and reliable.”).
117. The Register did not address whether performance in the form of a ringtone on a cell
phone rather than as a complete song in another medium is a performance “by different artistic
means.” The Register seems to have concluded that it is by largely ignoring that portion of the
definition. See id. at 64,314 (rejecting the music publishers’ claim that the ringtone is an
abridgement rather than an arrangement, but not considering why the shortening of the original
song was necessary). But is the conclusion supported? Is modifying a song to accommodate
technical limitations of the media the same thing as “conform[ing] it to the style or manner of”
the performer under § 115(a)(2) Beyoncé’s style is Beyoncé’s style. The monophonic ringtone of
her song is not changed to conform to her style; it is changed to conform to the technical
limitations of the technology on which it is played. The conclusion that these are necessarily
“arrangements” may have been hastily arrived at.
118. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed.
Reg. at 64,314 (quoting WALDO SELDEN PRATT, THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MUSIC AND
MUSICIANS (1929)).
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all four representative types of ringtones. The true tone may be an
arrangement because it shortens the work and repeats only a selected
portion of the work. This is probably a “readjustment” of the work,
even though the Register concluded that shortening a song does not
affect its arrangement,119 because the selection of the part of the song
that the ringtone plays may differ from what the artist originally
120
intended. This definition also probably applies to both monophonic
and polyphonic ringtones despite the technical requirements of
producing these ringtone types,121 as the process of incorporating
different instruments—in the case of ringtones, a synthesizer—
changes the composition by adding or removing harmonic elements
of the work. The only type of ringtone that may not be within this
category is the true tones plus ringtone, such as the one featuring
Beyoncé,122 that adds additional spoken words. Because the spoken
words are additional creative lines, they may be outside the scope of
123
an arrangement and qualify as an entirely new derivative work.
With the derivative works issue aside, however, it is likely that even
these true tones plus would fall within the definition of
“arrangement.” After all, a musical notation of the ringtone can
include the additional words of Beyoncé, and this difference readjusts
the work from its original form.124 Thus, all four types of ringtones
might qualify as arrangements but may still be subject to scrutiny
under some of the other requirements before passing the § 115(a)(2)
test.

119. Id.
120. After all, a given song could have various ringtones—all of which are unique—with
each encompassing a different selection of the sound recording.
121. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
124. A district court articulated the differences required to consider a work a derivative
work:
In order . . . to qualify as a musically ‘derivative work,’ . . . [t]here must be such things
as unusual vocal treatment, additional lyrics of consequence, unusual altered
harmonies, novel sequential uses of themes—something of substance added making
the piece to some extent a new work with the old song embedded in it but from which
the new has developed.
Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (emphasis added), rev’d on other
grounds, 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
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125

The second explicit limitation on the safe harbor provision for
the adaptation right is a significant one; the arrangement may only be
prepared “to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner
of interpretation of the performance involved.”126 This restriction is
perhaps the most constraining on the scope of the mechanical license,
127
and yet commentators have misinterpreted it.
The legislative history behind this restriction merely echoes the
statutory language and adds no insight into the meaning behind the
128
clause. This legislative history does, however, acknowledge the
purpose behind the broader subsection of § 115(a)(2), stating that the
clause “is intended to recognize the practical need for a limited
privilege to make arrangements of music being used under a
compulsory license, but without allowing the music to be perverted,
distorted, or travestied.”129 It must be stressed that this bit of legislative
history illuminates the purpose behind all of § 115(a)(2).
130
Commentators —including Professor Nimmer—have failed to
recognize this broader purpose and instead use the phrase “perverted,
distorted, or travestied” to give meaning to the positive limitation
that the arrangement be only “to the extent necessary.”131
These commentators instead have read the clause to mean that
when the “basic melody or fundamental character of the work” is left
undisturbed, then the arrangement does not exceed the bounds of the
“extent necessary to conform” requirement. Professor Nimmer, on
the other hand, does acknowledge this clause, albeit in a backhand
way. He states that

125. See infra note 128.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
127. See infra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
128. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 109 (1976) (“Clause (2) [of § 115(a)] permits
arrangements of a work ‘to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of
interpretation of the performance involved,’ so long as it does not ‘change the basic melody or
fundamental character of the work.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2))).
129. Id. (emphasis added).
130. See, e.g., Mario F. Gonzalez, Are Musical Compositions Subject to Compulsory
Licensing for Ringtones?, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 11, 24 (2006) (failing to find the word
“necessary” to be of any significance); Robert J. Morrison, Deriver’s Licenses: An Argument for
Establishing a Statutory License for Derivative Works, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 87, 97
(2006) (same).
131. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[F] (“Still, the variation may not be so
great as to allow the music to be ‘perverted, distorted or travestied.’”).
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if there is to be a right at all to record anew under the compulsory
license, it must envisage some minimal change and new
arrangement, if only to conform to the range and style of the
licensee’s performers. Still, beyond such necessary changes, the
132
compulsory licensee’s right to make new arrangements is limited.

Aside from this brief tribute of the “to the extent necessary” clause,
however, Nimmer does little to advance any notion of what it does or
should mean. Perhaps this is because no court has analyzed the scope
of § 115(a)(2)133 or perhaps it is because Nimmer does not recognize
the “necessary to conform” clause to be a separate and independent
requirement.
Congress does not often use the word “necessary” in the
Copyright Act, and so it is unwise—perhaps irresponsible—to read
such a robust adjective out of the statute. In fact, aside from the
provisions describing the responsibilities of the Copyright Tribunal
134
Board, the word “necessary” only appears three times throughout
the entire Copyright Act as originally enacted.135 Furthermore, the
legislative history supports this view. The legislative history
demonstrates that the phrase “to the extent necessary” has real bite
that cannot be ignored. Yet no case, treatise or law review article136
even has analyzed this history.
In 1964, more than a decade before the final enactment of the
Copyright Act of 1976, the House Committee on the Judiciary held a
hearing to analyze various sections of the Act to determine their

132. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[F] (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
133. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
134. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 116(c)(5), 805(a), 806(a), 90 Stat.
2541, 2564, 2598 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 116, 805–06 (2000)) (using the word
“necessary”).
135. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(4), 115(a)(2), 708(c) (2000) (using the word “necessary”). The
word “necessary” does appear more regularly in later amendments to the Copyright Act,
including the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)
(using the word “necessary” thirteen times).
136. The legislative history behind § 115(a)(2) has been acknowledged. See Theresa M.
Bevilacqua, Note, Time to Say Goodbye to Madonna’s American Pie: Why Mechanical
Compulsory Licensing Should Be Put to Rest, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 285, 297–98
(2001) (discussing the “compromise of 1964”). Bevilacqua’s discussion, however, focuses more
on the phrase “fundamental character of the work” rather than the instant discussion of the
“extent necessary to” clause. See id. (discussing the debate over whether to limit an artist’s
adaptation right).
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feasibility.137 In the context of the § 115 license,138 then-current
Register of Copyrights, Abraham Kaminstein, presented three
different versions of the compulsory license. The first, labeled
139
Alternative A, simply eliminated the compulsory license.
Alternative B, which garnered the most support and eventually was
incorporated into § 115 of the 1976 Act,140 included a similar provision
141
to § 115(a)(2). Lastly, Alternative C attempted to find middle
ground between the first two alternatives by creating a compulsory
license only after a five-year period following the initial distribution,
during which the copyright owner would have exclusive rights to
mechanical reproductions.142
Alternative B contained a phrase very similar to § 115(a)(2)’s
arrangement provision, which allowed for the “privilege of making
whatever arrangement or adaptation of the work may be reasonably
necessary to conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the
143
performance involved.” In contrast, § 115(a)(2) allows the licensee
to arrange the work only “to the extent necessary” within the style or
144
manner of interpretation of the performance involved. The hearings
on this “reasonably necessary” adaptation right included two
exchanges in which representatives of music authors and publishers
argued that the language was too generous to the licensee. It is likely
that such dialogues contributed, at least in part, to the subsequent
deletion of the word “reasonably” in the resulting legislation.

137. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION,
PART 3: PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND
COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT 1 (Comm. Print 1964).
138. This license is § 115 in the Copyright Act of 1976; in these hearings, the license was
referred to as § 11.
139. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 137, at 8 (providing the text of
Alternative A); 3 THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT: A COMPENDIUM AND
ANALYTICAL INDEX OF MATERIALS LEADING TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976, at 13–14
(Alan Latman & James F. Lightstone eds., 1983).
140. Bevilacqua, supra note 136, at 297–98.
141. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 137, at 8–11 (“The privilege of
making a sound recording under a compulsory license . . . shall also include the privilege of
making whatever arrangement or adaptation of the work may be reasonably necessary to
conform it to the style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved.”); 3 THE
KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 139, at 14–16 (same).
142. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 137, at 11–13 (providing the
text of Alternative C); 3 THE KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 139, at
16–18 (same).
143. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 137, at 9 (emphasis added).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2000) (using the word “necessary”).
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First, Julian Abeles, a member of the Music Publishers’
145
Protective Association, representing the Harry Fox Agency at the
hearing, commented on the adaptation phrase.146 After analyzing the
language, Abeles came to the conclusion that this did not sufficiently
protect the copyright owner. Specifically, Abeles testified “that this is
a dangerous provision because, under that provision, radical
147
alterations can be made to the material detriment of the work.” He
viewed the provision as allowing too expansive of a right to the
licensee.
Second, Leon Kellman, representing the American Guild of
Authors and Composers, testified on the same provision of
Alternative B.148 His words are worth repeating:
Now, this arrangement provision causes a great fear in my mind in
another respect. We think of arrangements in terms of pop songs.
What about serious music—the man who writes a symphony, a
sonata, something where the orchestration and the arrangement are
an integral part of the composition? Will this provision give anyone
the right to make a crazy arrangement—to jazz it up, to make his
own arrangement? This provision is, as someone here said, “rough
on serious music.” It is horrible for serious music, and I think you
are going to have to make a distinction in preserving the integrity of
149
that type of music, which must not be rearranged.

Kellman and Julian Abeles both felt the need to constrain the
proposed arrangement privilege.
150
A later bill introduced in Congress, H.R. 4347, amended the
proposed language to accord with the language in § 115(a)(2): “A
compulsory license includes the privilege of making a musical
arrangement of the work to the extent necessary to conform it to the
151
style or manner of interpretation of the performance involved . . . .”
The modifier “reasonably” was dropped. Although the legislative

145. The Harry Fox Agency, Inc. is the primary organization facilitating the mechanical
compulsory license by collecting and distributing the fees on behalf of music publishers. See
Harry Fox Agency, About HFA, http://www.harryfox.com/public/HFAHome.jsp (last visited
Apr. 31, 2008).
146. STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 137, at 216–17.
147. Id. at 217.
148. Id. at 231–32.
149. Id. at 232.
150. See 111 CONG. REC. 2076 (1965) (recording the introduction of H.R. 4347 on February
4, 1965).
151. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong. (1965).
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history does not explain this change, Kellman’s and Abeles’s
comments reflected a desire to constrict the previously flexible
language of “reasonably necessary.” The change directly followed the
testimony, and because there were no other indications of alternative
grounds for the change, their testimony likely prompted the more
restrictive language found in § 115(a)(2).
The music industry must take this change in the legislative
history seriously. Although reliance on the compulsory license may be
minimal152 because most licenses are operated consensually at a price
lower than the statutory minimum,153 the § 115 compulsory licenses
play an important practical role. Because parties always may invoke
the compulsory license if negotiations fail, all voluntary negotiations
are conducted in the shadow of the mechanical license. Thus, a
change in the interpretation or application of § 115(a)(2) would have
a significant impact on the ringtone industry, notwithstanding the fact
that the trade may not rely on the license for royalties.
So where does all of this lead? The provision, as supplemented
by the legislative history of the term “necessary,” sets an outer limit
to the amount of alteration to the original that may be incurred. The
licensee is entitled to make an “arrangement” of the work but only
“to the extent necessary to conform it to the style or manner of
154
interpretation of the performance involved.” Perhaps the best way
to see what this mandate entails is to see what works change their
155
status under § 115(a)(2) with this legislative gloss.
Applying this legislative gloss to the four types of ringtones, only
some meet the requirements for a mechanical license under §
115(a)(2). When adapting a sound recording to become a ringtone, it
is necessary to conform the original musical work to the inherently
short nature of a ringer on a cell phone (that is, twenty to thirty
seconds). Although shortening the ringtone would be permissible
under § 115(a)(2), what about other changes? Monophonic and
156
polyphonic ringtones too would fall within what is necessary to

152. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[I] (“In actual practice, the statutory
mechanism is rarely invoked in the industry.”).
153. Id. (“Given that a record manufacturer can always threaten to invoke the compulsory
license without the copyright owners’ consent, the statutory scheme functions as a ‘ceiling’ on
the price that those owners may charge, absent an agreement among the parties.”).
154. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2000).
155. See supra Part II.A.
156. See supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text.
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conform to the medium of a cell phone ringtone. After all,
monophonic and polyphonic ringtones are precisely the sort of
reproduction that is embodied in the statute, because it is necessary to
use a synthesizer to reach the desired interpretation.
But what if the polyphonic ringtone also included Beyoncé’s
speaking voice? Assuming that the other criteria of § 115(a)(2) are
157
met, it is likely that this change on the phonorecord would extend
beyond that which is necessary to conform the original musical work
to the ringtone medium. It would suffice for the ringtone to have
merely the song without more. Adding Beyoncé’s speaking voice
even without changing the melody or the fundamental character of
the work goes beyond what is “necessary.” Ultimately, whether these
ringtones may included within § 115 will relate to whether that
portion of the ringtone is part and parcel of the arrangement or
merely constitutes additional material which falls outside the scope of
the ringtone’s arrangement of the original work. Courts should
interpret the text and legislative history of the statute to reflect the
congressional intent.
C. Change “the Basic Melody”
The third requirement expressed in § 115(a)(2) is that a given
ringtone “shall not change the basic melody” of the original.158 This
barrier to the mechanical license, like “to the extent necessary”
clause, may pose a significant hurdle to the record labels’ claim to the
mechanical license. To illustrate, consider the analogy between a true
tone in which a small portion of the overarching song is lifted and
looped to form the ringtone and a writer lifting a small quotation out
of a book. In both cases, the portion lifted has creative components;
even a few sentences of a book or a few seconds from a song meet the
originality requirement set forth by the Supreme Court in Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.159 As the amount

157. This ringtone would be an arrangement because its polyphonic nature would require
rearranging the work to a synthesizer. If the speaking voice came at the end of the song, then it
would not alter the melody of the work. Yet if Beyoncé is not the author of the musical
composition, this change might “alter the fundamental character of the work.” 17 U.S.C.
§ 115(a)(2); see also Bevilacqua, supra note 136, at 309–10 (advocating an increased recognition
for an author’s moral rights through § 115(a)(2)).
158. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
159. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (“Original . . . means
only that the work was independently created by the author . . . and that it possesses at least
some minimal degree of creativity.”); see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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lifted becomes smaller, it may approach unprotectability. For
instance, any two words from a book, no matter how creative the
entire book is, will not be accorded protection because copyright law
will not remove a two-word combination of expressing ideas from the
public domain.160 Likewise, any two chords lifted from an original
song will not be protected.161
There is a line between what is protectable and unprotectable,
but the real question becomes whether lifting a ten or fifteen second
portion of the song is a change in the basic melody such that it
violates § 115(a)(2). The answer depends on the characterization of
the melody. If the melody is that of the entire work, then cutting out a
portion of the work changes the melody. In contrast, if the melody is
seen as small segments of melody which, when combined in a
sequential matter, comprise the song, then lifting one full segment
does not change the melody. Luckily, it is not necessary to choose
sides; Congress has done so already. Section 115(a)(2) requires that
“the arrangement shall not change the basic melody . . . of the
work.”162 The “work” is the entire musical work, and the melody of
the work therefore must be the entire melodic sequence of the song.163
Thus, under a strict interpretation of the text, it is possible that a
court using this reasoning would infer that any shortening of the work
alters the basic melody.

160. Ideas are not protected under the Copyright Act, only expression. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any
idea . . . .”).
161. But see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 656–61 (6th Cir. 2004)
(holding that digital sampling, even involving only three notes at a time, constituted copyright
infringement), amended on reh’g by 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
162. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (emphasis added).
163. Although the Copyright Register did address the copyright owners’ contention that
Congress’ use of “works” rather than “portions of works” signifies that the work as a whole is to
be considered, this was in the context of the broader outline of § 115. See Mechanical and
Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Adjustment Proceeding, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,303, 64,307–09
(Copyright Office Nov. 1, 2006) (final order) (“Copyright Owners argue that because a ringtone
is not a reproduction of the entire musical work it is not subject to the [§ 115] statutory
license.”). These arguments cannot refute § 115(a)(2)’s explicit reference to the “melody of the
work” because lifting only a portion of the work necessarily impairs the melody of the entire
work. To read the statute otherwise would render the word “melody” superfluous if the
underlying “work” could be shortened so that the melody shrinks into oblivion.
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D. “Fundamental Character”
The fourth and final requirement found in § 115(a)(2) is that
“the arrangement shall not change the . . . fundamental character of
the work.”164 This factor, however, is unlikely to affect whether a
given ringtone is included in the mechanical license, because any
ringtone that already passes through the other three hurdles is
unlikely to affect the “fundamental character” of the original.
The “fundamental character” element represents the outer
bound of the safe harbor, although the phrase is not defined in the
Act. It does, however, connote a broader meaning than merely
changing the basic melody. In fact, it envisions a limited regime of
moral rights, in which the integrity of the author and her work are
protected, to the owner of the musical work copyright, often not
165
found in the American system of copyright law. How far these
moral rights travel in protecting the composer is a matter of much
more uncertainty. There is one principle with which few courts or
commentators would disagree: if a musical work consists of both
instrumental music and corresponding lyrics, it does not violate the
“fundamental character” of the work to invoke the mechanical
license in a purely instrumental version with no lyrics.166
With this notion in mind, it may be difficult to argue that any of
the representative types of ringtones which have already passed the
previous three filters of § 115(a)(2)—the “arrangement requirement,”
the all-important “extent necessary to” obstacle, and the “basic
melody” hurdle—actually does change the “fundamental character”
of the work. After all, monophonic and polyphonic ringtones are also
instrumental representations of the sound recording. Of course, true
tones stay even closer to the original by merely shortening the work.

164. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2).
165. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[F] (“Such respect for the integrity of a
musical composition evinces Congressional regard for the moral rights of composers, the sole
explicit recognition of moral rights in the entire Copyright Act until passage of the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990.” (footnotes omitted)).
166. See id. (noting that courts have recognized a licensee’s right to “produce a purely
instrumental version” of “an authorized recording contain[ing] both music and lyrics”). One
commentator has observed:
[I]t is difficult to see how an instrumental version of a song could be said to “distort,
pervert or make a travesty” of a composition. It is even more difficult to see how such
a transformative and original musical arrangement would not contain the requisite
originality to be considered a composition deserving full copyright protection in its
own right.
Note, Jazz Has Got Copyright Law and That Ain’t Good, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1940, 1955 (2005).
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The additional lyrics added in a true tones plus ringtone may,
depending on its substance, cross the line, but presumably such a
ringtone would already be eliminated from the mechanical statutory
167
license because it constitutes a derivative work.
The idea that this fourth and final requirement actually lacks
substantive teeth may be ironically fitting. In a legal system largely
devoid of protecting the moral rights of copyright owners, it should
come as no surprise that the mechanical license is no different. In
practical effect, the “fundamental character” requirement, like the
three other hurdles of § 115(a)(2), lends itself toward restricting the
licensee’s ability to pervert or travesty the original musical work while
still providing for a limited adaptation right for the proliferation of
musical works to be enjoyed by the public at large.
CONCLUSION
Cell phone ringtones have grown enormously in popularity,168
and with this surge comes a significant increase in revenue for the
industry. Indeed, monetary rewards are precisely the type of
compensation that the Framers thought best to encourage the
169
proliferation of creative works. As such, they developed a system of
copyright to ensure that monetary rewards, when paid to the
copyright owners, would then encourage the artist to create more
works. A shift in these expectations could fundamentally alter the
rewards-based system, with the result that artists actually become
discouraged from creating new works. As a result, it is essential that
these rewards are paid to the correct party, and to that end, this Note
proposes a new approach for interpreting § 115.
The statutory language of § 115(a) and its corresponding safe
harbor subsection of § 115(a)(2) can be read either as a whole or in
part. The former approach, which most commentators appear to have
taken, allows any adaptation so long as it does not “pervert[],
170
distort[], or travest[y]” the original work. This interpretation seems

167. See supra Part I.B.
168. Victoria Shannon, Global Market for Cellphone Ring Tones Is Shrinking, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2007, at C2.
169. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 1.03[A] n.2
(“[T]he real purpose of the copyright scheme is to encourage works of the intellect, and . . . this
purpose is to be achieved by the reliance on the economic incentives granted to authors and
inventors by the copyright scheme.”).
170. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 109 (1976).
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to be in contradiction to the “limited” adaptation privilege that was
envisioned by the enacting Congress.171 The latter interpretation—
reading the statutory language literally and carefully—results in an
approach that is much more faithful to the legislative history and
traditional methods of statutory interpretation. This Note endorses
that latter approach. Either way, much of what this Note explores will
be resolved not in the Register’s office, but in the courts. The
financial stakes of the model of statutory interpretation that the
courts ultimately choose are high. In the case of ringtones, it
determines how much record companies will have to pay to music
publishers and ultimately how much consumers will have to pay for
their ringtones. The courts’ final say on the matter will have a
dramatic impact on the burgeoning market for ringtones.

171. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 17, § 8.04[F] (“[T]he compulsory licensee’s right to
make new arrangements is limited.”).

